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This study focuses on developing a superior indexation approach
using readily available accounting information and circumventing the
limitation of size-only investment criteria. Since the advent of ex-
change-traded funds (ETFs), not only has the number of strategies avail-
able to small and institutional investors experienced a signiﬁcant
upsurge, but fees and costs have also dropped signiﬁcantly. These revo-
lutionary products have drastically improved passive management ser-
vices, as they offer a clear investment objective and a transparent
benchmark strategy, along with stringent regulatory supervision and
the beneﬁts of an exchange-listed vehicle. At the same time, activeman-
agers could take advantage of these packaged products, gaining a cost-
effective exposure to a broad range of asset classes, whilst the introduc-
tion of active ETFs ﬁlled the gap by offering enhanced returns within a
well-regulated framework. With time, markets have blended active
and passive investments until the boundary is no longer neatly deﬁned.
It is clear that this 3-trillion dollar industry1 has reshaped investment
approaches from retail to institutional investors and, given its vast
diversity, deserves attention and deeper understanding.
The capitalisation-weighted investment approach has always been
the core building block for the passive portfolio managementeading, Whiteknights, Reading
, c.brooks@icmacentre.ac.uk
reports.
. This is an open access article undercommunity and thehighest proportion of themoney invested in passive
investment is tied to value-weighted indices. Over the last decade, the
traditional strategy of investing in the market portfolio has been chal-
lenged by the so-called “smart beta” strategies, which, although consis-
tent with rules-based investments, outperform the benchmark by
capturing market inefﬁciencies. Furthermore, purely passive invest-
ments in derivatives markets may lead to low long-term returns. Good
examples are the ETFs that invest in the front-month futures contract
(e.g. oil ETFs) that “bleed” money if the rolling of the investment takes
place in a contango market environment (i.e. the next futures contract
is more expensive).
This study aims to put forward superior indexing strategies repre-
sentative of the UK market based on readily available accounting infor-
mation, which, by weighting companies differently from their market
valuation, eradicates the performance drag and offers higher risk efﬁ-
cient returns. Different from the existing literature, we eschew balance
sheet measures and propose two indices that revolve solely around in-
come statement (P&L) and dividend measures. The income and divi-
dend-based indices are intuitive and simple to construct, have
reduced exposures to standard risk factors (size, value and market
risk) and avoid strategy construction based on book values. Further,
the pure dividend-based approach, which we also employ, does not
use accounting variables at all, which avoid the subjectiveness2 of
such measures. Dividends (and earnings per share) do not suffer from
creative accounting and are comparable across different legislations2 Accounting measures may be misleading due to different accounting conventions
across countries and the existence of creative accounting.
the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
2 M. Balatti et al. / International Review of Financial Analysis 51 (2017) 1–15and accounting standards. As such, our ﬁndings are generalizable and
the results more likely to be robust when tested in different economies.
We ﬁnd that these accounting based weighting schemes deliver an an-
nual outperformance of between 2.39% and 3.59% over the FTSE 100 and
up to twofold increases in the Sharpe and Sortino ratios. The procedure
employed, which is deliberately left unconstrained, leads to very
favourable results. Most notably, we ﬁnd that our index designs have
positive and signiﬁcant Fama-French 3-factor and Carhart 4-factor al-
phas. The indices maintain an overlap with the FTSE 100 of approxi-
mately 90% in terms of total market capitalisation and constituent
members. We also benchmark the results to Arnott, Hsu, and Moore's
(2005) fundamental indexing design, using a data sample of UK equities
over a period that contains the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis. The suggested strat-
egies also comfortably outperform Arnott et al. under a variety of
metrics.
Overall, the exercise contributes to the literature by providing an in-
depth analysis of the virtues of fundamental non-balance sheet based in-
dices compared to their cap weighted counterparts. Findings show that
fundamental strategieswork in theUK stockmarket and are clearly bet-
ter than cap-weighted indices. In particular, unlike other Market Value
Indifferent (MVI)3 designs previously proposed in the literature, our
fundamental indices are able to generate signiﬁcant 3- and 4-factor al-
phas. By disregarding balance sheet measures and focusing on Proﬁt
and Loss variables to construct the indices, this study differentiates
from previous research, indicating that our indexation strategy signiﬁ-
cantly outperforms the traditional fundamental indexing schemes and
offers lower exposure to size and value factors.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the
existing academic literature on market value indifferent (MVI) index-
ation, including the theoretical debate and empirical evidence. Section
3 outlines the data collection process and the index construction meth-
odologies proposed here. Section 4 presents the results of the empirical
test run on the UK FTSE All Share index. Sections 5 and 6 depict, respec-
tively, robustness tests of the results and the performance attribution.
Finally, Section 7 concludes and analyses possible implications of the
study.4 Of course, deviations from fundamentalsmay also take place for other reasons such as
the limits to arbitrage discussed, for example, by Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
52. Existing research on price-indifferent indexation schemes
2.1. Indexation schemes
2.1.1. Cap-weighted indexing
The most common indexation methodology, capitalisation
weighting, provides a number of advantages. First, it offers an accurate
representation of the available investment opportunities, as their
weighting corresponds to their dimension on the market. Second,
these indices are market-clearing portfolios, i.e. there is a balance be-
tween demand (investors) and supply (shares). Any deviations from
CW design would, by construction, mean that the portfolio would not
be able to encompass the whole market. In other words, if every single
market participant invests according to cap weights, there would be no
securities left unsold, i.e. the primary markets would be cleared as each
investor's portfolio would hold companies in the same proportions as
the whole market (absolute weights would differ, but relative weights
would be equal). On the other hand, should all stockholders invest in
a single alternative scheme, there would be an imbalance between the
demand for shares (implied by the weight assigned by their strategy)
and their supply (given by the market capitalisation of each listed
ﬁrm). Third, they represent the performance of the average investor,
which makes it a reasonable investment benchmark. The latter is a di-
rect consequence of the second advantage, namely the market-clearing3 Throughout thepaper,wewill refer toMVI or price-indifferent strategies interchange-
ably to encompass any indexation design that deviates from cap weighting.characteristic. Lastly, capitalisation weighted portfolios do not require
rebalancing in components' weights as prices ﬂuctuate unless the
index constituents change (index re-composition events, additions or
deletions). Thus the low turnover ﬁgures of these portfolios, presented
in Section 3, should not be surprising.
Since, from its deﬁnition under the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM), the market portfolio comprises all risky assets with weights
in the proportions that they occur in the market, cap weighted indices
have been used extensively as market portfolio proxies. Accordingly,
stock weights in the market portfolio coincide with company weights
in the CW index. This modus operandi is still practiced today notwith-
standing Roll (1977) arguing that the true market portfolio cannot be
measured.
Despite the widely reported beneﬁts of cap–weighting, the strategy
has faced important criticisms by previous research; in the context of
securities valuation, stock prices may differ from their fair fundamental
values by random noise.4 By deﬁnition, overvalued stocks will have ex-
perienced positive noise, whereas undervalue stocks experienced nega-
tive noise. As Treynor (2005) suggests, when market capitalisation
weighting (CW) is employed to construct an investment portfolio, larg-
er bets are placed on over-valued companies relative to their unobserv-
able fair values, and smaller bets are placed on under-valued ones.5 Cap-
weighted indices do not disentangle company weighting from valua-
tion, as the former is directly related to the latter, and this peculiarity
causes the (unobservable) noise in stock prices to be embedded twice
in the portfolio: in the purchase price and in the weighting. Effectively,
CW mirrors market values and echoes them in the constituent propor-
tions, thereby provoking a further ampliﬁcation of any price noise.
Therefore, perhaps unsurprisingly, a study by Chen, Chen, and Bassett
(2007) has shown that where cap weights aremagniﬁed (cap squared),
returns worsen, whereas, when weights are smoothed (via roots, equal
weight or smoothed averages), performances improve.
Numerous other studies starting fromMayers (1976) have reported
limitations of the CAPM and the use of cap weighting indices as market
portfolio proxies. Ross (1978), Gibbons (1982), Zhou (1991), Fama and
French (1998) and Dalang, Osinski, Marty, and Dalang (2001), to cite
but a few, all reject the mean-variance efﬁciency of capitalization
weighted indices. Accordingly, these ﬁndings imply an ex-ante inefﬁ-
ciency of the whole passive investment industry (Branch & Cai, 2010;
Haugen & Baker, 1991). A new strand of literature has since begun in-
vestigating price indifferent strategies that could alleviate this natural
performance drag and develop better ways to index, i.e. to construct
portfolios that offer higher risk-adjusted returns.
Arnott et al. (2005) were perhaps the pioneers of the smart beta
strategies.6 Many others, including Amenc, Goltz, Lodh, and Martellini
(2012), then followed. Roll and Ross (1994), in seeking a superior in-
dexation methodology, concluded that: (i) ex ante identiﬁcation is im-
possible; and (ii) cap-weight indices lie only 22 basis points away
from the efﬁcient frontier. Although conceptually different, these strat-
egies' common denominator is their attempt to provide a clear and sim-
ple methodology (in the spirit of passive investing) that deviated from
the more popular CW schemes (resembling active strategies).2.1.2. Optimisation based indexing
In the last decade the literature on new indexation methodologies
has been very proliﬁc and two coexisting strands of indexing schemes,
following the Chow, Hsu, Kalesnik, and Little (2011) classiﬁcation,This statement assumes that the true company fair value, given by the present value of
the expected income ﬂow, is unknown by investors.
6 Their Research Afﬁliates Fundamental Index™ (Ticker: PRF) includes 1000 US stocks
and has outperformed the Russell 1000 index by 87 basis points per year, as of 03/31/
2016, since inception (source: www.invescopowershares.com).
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based strategies take the CAPM andmodern portfolio theory a step fur-
ther. In the light of the criticismsdescribed above, these strategies retain
the general framework, meaning that they are still mean variance opti-
mizers (MVO), yet they twist some of the assumptions in order to ad-
dress the shortfalls highlighted. Although, theoretically, MVO are an
excellent way to form ex ante efﬁcient portfolios, the estimation of the
two required inputs i.e. expected returns and expected covariances,
can be very challenging. Furthermore, Chopra and Ziemba (1993) and
Michaud (1989) report that forecasting errors in the input parameters
translate into meaningfully reduced performance of the output
portfolio.
The most prominentMVO strategies include the approaches of min-
imum variance, maximum diversiﬁcation, risk efﬁciency and relative
risk optimisation. In the context of a minimum variance strategy,
Haugen andBaker (1991) and Clarke, De Silva, and Thorley (2006) over-
come the inherent estimation difﬁculties by implicitly assuming con-
stant expected returns across all stocks. The maximum diversiﬁcation
strategy introduces the diversiﬁcation ratio as themain driver of portfo-
lio construction; Choueifaty and Coignard (2008) link the volatility of a
stock to its premium return by a simple linear relationship and deter-
mine companies' weights in the index by optimizing the portfolio
Sharpe ratio. The risk efﬁcient strategy is in line with the traditional
CAPM theory, andmaintains the same explicit risk return efﬁciency tar-
get by maximising the Sharpe ratio (Amenc, Goltz, Martellini, &
Retkowsky, 2011). The strategy of model and risk optimisation involves
non-mutually exclusive portfolio construction methodologies with the
explicit aim to a) address model selection and relative performance
risk, whilst b) increasing the probability of outperforming cap-weighted
indices (Amenc et al., 2012).
2.1.3. Heuristic strategies – equal and fundamental weighting
On the other hand, heuristic strategies embody the concepts of equal
weighting and fundamental weighting. In the equal weighting frame-
work, where the weight of each company is set to 1/N, there are disad-
vantageous consequences requiring consideration. For instance, cap-
weighting beneﬁts, such as liquidity, investment capacity, performance
characteristics and being representative of the average investor in the
equity market, are not conserved when equally weighting. Moreover,
this indexing design is highly sensitive to the number of constituents in-
cluded. The latter point is exempliﬁed by looking at the difference of the
S&P 500 and the Russell 1000 and their corresponding equallyweighted
benchmarks. In this regard, there exists a minimal return difference be-
tween the two cap-weighted indices. However,when all stocks have the
same loading (1/500 for the S&P and 1/1000 for the Russell) the perfor-
mance difference between the two is considerably ampliﬁed. In other
words, when two diverse benchmarks are cap-weighted, their risk-re-
turn characteristics are quite similar, but when they are equally weight-
ed, the difference is more pronounced. Lastly, there is also a logical
inconsistency with this index design since in an index formed of 500
stocks, the smallest company has the same importance as the largest,
whereas the 501st has a zero weight.
In the case of fundamentalweighting, Arnott et al. (2005) attempt to
reinvent indexing by focusing on a simple strategy that could over-per-
form, in mean-variance terms, that based on market cap. Four account-
ing values, namely sales, cash ﬂow, book value and dividends, taken in
relative terms to the remaining companies, equally contribute to set
the weight of each stock in the index. Their hypothesis, supported by
the results in the paper, that themarket is noisy in the short run and ef-
ﬁcient in the long run. The latter predicts that fundamental indexing
will perform better over longer horizons. Many practitioners, such as
ETFs issuers, follow the ‘fundamental’ spirit of Arnott and modify it by
only considering dividends as weighting factor. This approach is sup-
ported by the intrinsic nature of dividends as a fundamental measure
not affected by creative accounting nor different accounting standards,
and is therefore objective and transparent (Siegel, 2006). Furtherstudies have supported alternative strategies of fundamental indexing
using smoothed cap weights by setting stock loadings to be equal to
the median of the last 12 to 120 months capitalisation weight (Chen
et al., 2007) and collared weighting by assigning cap weights unless
they diverge signiﬁcantly from fundamentals (Arya & Kaplan, 2006).
2.2. Capitalisation vs market value indifferent weighting - the theoretical
debate
Following the empirical evidence in favour of MVI in Arnott et al.
(2005), the literature has focused on understandingwhether the results
were sample-speciﬁc or were likely to persist in the future. Therefore,
research began to investigate CW and MVI theoretically and gave rise
to a debate. The major contributors supporting the new approaches,
such as Treynor (2005), Hsu (2006), Arnott and Hsu (2008), all argue
that CW suffers from a performance drag caused by the index design
that gives more weight to overvalued stocks and less weight to those
which are undervalued. In other words, they assume that market prices
are not efﬁcient, i.e. they are equal to fair value plus noise. Yet, the pric-
ing errors of over and undervalued stocks will counterbalance, making
its expected value equal to zero in the cross section. This means that ar-
bitrageurs cannot exploit the inefﬁciencies directly by implementing
stock-picking strategies. Furthermore, a common denominator of
these studies is the realistic assumption that investors do not need to
know the true value of a company in order to beneﬁt by investing fol-
lowing this style.
Mathematically, the theoretical supremacy of MVI can be traced to
the covariance of weights with market prices being equal to zero,
whereas for CW they are positive. Equal weighting (EW), for instance,
will invest in the same number of overpriced and underpriced stocks,
assuming that pricing errors are iid (independently and identically dis-
tributed). In magnitude or money terms, the two portions will tend to
be equal, as opposed to CW, which places higher bets on overvalued
companies and lower bets on those that are undervalued. A direct con-
sequence of this portfolio construction that invests the same proportion
in small and large cap stockswill therefore be a small-capmarket bias in
comparison with CW. EW and MVI strategies will hence suffer from a
higher sensitivity to this risk factor. In summary, weighting schemes
that assign loadings to companies randomly with respect to market
mispricing will buy more fair value and should therefore outperform
CW. This is the case even without reversion to fair values (Treynor,
2005). Should reversion to true value occur, the positive gains relative
to CWwould be even higher.
The most important opposition to MVI methodologies is perhaps
due to Perold (2007). He states that CW does not inherently lead to a
performance drag and that the expected return of this strategy is iden-
tical to that of an equally weighted one. The core of the problem, in his
view, is thatMVI rests on fair value and by keeping it constant, MVI sup-
porters build the market price distribution around it by using the noise
probability distribution. He argues that, implicitly, MVI advocates make
the unrealistic assumption that stockholders do know fair value. In fact,
they only observe market prices and therefore can use the error distri-
bution around this ﬁgure. Perold (2007) also claims that since price
noise is uncorrelatedwith fair values it is also uncorrelatedwithmarket
values, and thus the true value distribution around the observedmarket
price is just the same as the market price distribution around fair value.
For this reason, he believes that market cap weighting does not suffer
from an a priori downward performance bias. A year later, Jun and
Malkiel (2008) presented research opposed to fundamental indexing
approaches by characterising them as active strategies that do not pro-
duce a positive alpha since their excess returns are explained by the
Fama-French factors. Tabner (2012) also favours the capitalisation ap-
proach over the equally weighted approach, with the former being
more robust in periods of negative shocks due to the lower than average
covariance of the largest index members and exhibiting better returns
and lower systematic risk.
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egywould investmore in overpriced companies and less in underpriced
ones, which implies that such a portfolio construction is not theoretical-
ly optimal. On the other hand, CW followers claim that one would have
to know fair values in order to implement an MVI scheme. However, as
true values are not observable, CW portfolios cannot be ex-ante
outperformed. Moreover, another of CW supporters' arguments is that
to discriminate against CW requires an additional unrealistic assump-
tion – namely that larger companies are more likely to be overvalued
and vice versa, i.e. that there exists a positive correlation between mar-
ket value and pricing error. Nevertheless, this assumption is never
expressed in any of the alternative strategies reviewed in this work.
An attempt to reconcile the two factions on MVI was made by
Treynor (2008) and Kaplan (2008). The former suggests that two differ-
ent and mutually exclusive assumptions lead to opposing conclusions
on performance drag. Speciﬁcally, CW assumes that the covariance be-
tween market price and noise is zero, whereas MVI proponents' theory
builds upon a zero covariance between fair value and pricing error.
Mathematically, the latter deﬁnes the boundarieswithinwhichCWper-
forms better than fundamental indexation. When the correlation be-
tween fundamental value and fair value is higher than the correlation
betweenmarket price and fair value,MVI beneﬁts fromhigher expected
returns.2.3. The empirical evidence
Different from the theoretical viewpoint, the empirical literature on
MVI is more homogeneous in its ﬁndings and elects MVI as a better in-
dexation methodology over CW. Numerous studies have shown that
cap weighted indices are often outperformed in absolute terms as well
as in risk adjusted terms. For instance, Arnott et al. (2005) posit that,
over a 43 year span, ‘Main Street’ metrics (fundamentals) applied to
the top thousand US stocks beneﬁt from an annual over performance
of almost 2% compared to a ‘Wall Street’ size measure. The CAPM
alpha is also found to be positive and statistically signiﬁcant. Along
these lines, Chow et al. (2011) test a variety of alternative indexing strat-
egies including those reported in Section 2 above and not only do they
ﬁnd CW constantly delivers inferior returns, but also that heuristic de-
signs outperform mean variance optimizers. Nonetheless, the superior
returns are no longer signiﬁcant once they are adjusted using the Carhart
4-factor model. These ﬁndings help to shed light on performance attribu-
tion: it is indeed found that alternative schemes are exposed to the value
and size factors, and most importantly, that performances are driven by
the larger bets placed on these known risk factors.7 Themethodology omits stocks listed on the AIM (Alternative InvestmentMarket) as the diff
combined universe heterogeneous. FTSE All-Share Index ﬁrms have to satisfy liquidity and size
empirical study is therefore careful in maintaining the investment universe constant to preser
8 See www.actuaries.org.uk.
9 We are grateful to Chris Godfrey for combining the FTSE All-share constituents from 1989Additional explanations have been offered by Branch and Cai (2010).
By contemporaneously testing fundamental metrics and cap weighting
transformations (squared andhigher roots of capweight, equalweights,
which behaves like an extreme root, and exponentials), they ﬁnd that:
a) fundamentals mostly outperformed, b) the square of CW
underperformed and c) the roots all outpaced their CW counterpart.
Most interestingly, the ﬁnding reported that the higher the root, the
larger the superior return delivered with equal weighing being the
overall winner. From their results, it can be inferred that when CW are
exaggerated (cap2), performances deteriorate, whereas when the dif-
ferences inweights are smoothed out (roots and equalweights), returns
are increased. In a more recent study by Amenc, Goltz, and Le Sourd
(2009), the performance of market-weighted indices was compared to
a set of characteristics-based indices in the US market, showing that
therewere no signiﬁcant abnormal returns after adjusting for value tilts.
Empirical analysis subsequent to Arnott et al. (2005) has conﬁrmed
that fundamental indexation applied to equity indices produces superi-
or returns in Eurozone countries (Hemminki & Puttonen, 2008), Austra-
lia (Mar, Bird, Casavecchia, & Yeung, 2009), and Germany (Mihm &
Locarek-Junge, 2010). Furthermore, Walkshäusl and Lobe (2010), in-
vestigate the performance of global and 50-country speciﬁc fundamen-
tally weighted portfolios providing evidence of outperforming global
fundamental indices but not country-speciﬁc indices. Finally, there is
also supporting evidence in favour of fundamental weighting when
companies are replaced by entire nations (country benchmarks and
ETFs) to form investment portfolios (Estrada, 2008).
Generally, empirical studies are unanimous that cap-weighted indi-
ces are not the best performers either in absolute terms or on a mean-
variance basis. Furthermore, the CAPM alphas of fundamentally con-
structed indices are in most cases positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
However, when risk factor models (Fama and French 3-factor model
or Carhart 4-factor model) are implemented, alphas are found to be ei-
ther negative or no longer signiﬁcant. It can be inferred that the drivers
of the superior performances are therefore value and size tilts of these
alternative portfolios.
Overall, it can be argued that the existing literature on alternative in-
dexation strategies adds more to the portfolio theory literature than to
the indexation one per se. Yet, ever since practitioners started using
cap-weighted indices as investment benchmarks and market portfolio
proxies, the line dividing these two topics has grown thinner. For this
reason, the purpose of the present study is to ﬁll a gap in the literature
investigating market value indifferent indexing in the UK economy
using a sample that includes what has been described as a once in 50-
year event and compared to the 1929 Great Depression, i.e. the 2008
Global Financial Crisis.3. Data collection and index construction
3.1. Investment universe construction
The investment universe comprises all FTSEAll-Share Index constituents from January 1989 until September 2014, includingﬁnancial companies:
Banks, Investment Trusts and Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). The sample of 16,716 ﬁrm-years includes both dead and live companies and,
thus does not suffer from survivorship bias. Both the FTSE All-Share Index and the FTSE 100 index are capitalisation-weighted indices.7 Members'
data from January 1989 to December 1995 are obtained from annual reports of constituents, name changes, inclusions and deletions recorded in
the Journal of the Institute of Actuaries (for values from 1989 to 1993) and the British Actuarial Journal (for values from 1994 and 1995).8 For January
1996 and September 2014, monthly FTSE All-share components are taken from Thompson Datastream.9 Individual industry memberships for each
ﬁrm are retrieved from the four-digit Industry Classiﬁcation Benchmark (ICB) Subsector code and no sectors are excluded a priori.erent listing and regulatory requirements (London Stock Exchange, 2010)wouldmake the
requirements and represent 98% of the total UK's market capitalisation (FTSE, 2015a). This
ve comparability.
with their respective Industry Classiﬁcation Benchmark (ICB) Subsector codes.
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Daily Securities prices and annual accounting data10 (fundamentals) of the FTSE All-Share Index's selected constituents are provided by
Compustat Global via Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). In mathematical and mnemonic terms, market capitalisations for company i at
time t are computed as follows11:
Market Capi;t ¼
Number of shares in issuei;t  Daily closing pricei;t
1;000;000
ð1Þ
The stocks' individual daily total return factors are calculated taking into account stock splits and dividends as:
TRi;t ¼
Daily closing pricei;t  Daily total return factori;t
Cumulative adjustment factor issueð Þ ex−datei;t
ð2Þ
This implies that companies' daily returns are deﬁned as the proportional increases between two consecutive daily total return factors, in mne-
monic terms:
returni;t ¼
TRt
TRt−1
−1 ð3Þ
In order to compare like with like, in rare occurrences where ﬁscal years are longer or shorter than 12months, ﬁgures from the income statement
and cash ﬂow reports are normalised to 12-month equivalents:
Accounting valuei;t ¼
Reported accounting valuei;t
Reported fiscal year length in monthsi;t
 12 ð4Þ
After having created a homogeneous and comparable playing ﬁeld across all ﬁrm-years, the accounting metrics not directly available from
Compustat Global were computed as follows12:
Equity book valuei;t ¼ Total common equityi;t þ Deferred taxes and investment tax crediti;t−Total preferred equityi;t ð5Þ
Cashflowi;t ¼ Earnings per share excluding extra itemi;t  Number of shares in issuei;t
 þ Cashflow relevant depreciationi;t
þ Cashflow relevant deferred taxesi;t ð6Þ
Dividend coveragei;t ¼
Earnings per share excluding extra itemi;t  Number of shares in issuei;t
 
Total dividendsi;t:
ð7Þ
Dividend payouti;t ¼
Total dividendsi;t
Earnings per share excluding extra itemi;t  Number of shares in issuei;t
  ð8Þ3.3. Index construction
We aim to eliminate the ex-ante inefﬁciency of cap weighting indices by constructing indices based on accountingmetrics and to create superior in-
dices compared to the FTSE 100, the chosen benchmark. The FTSE 100 constituents are picked from the FTSEAll-Share universe based on certain require-
ments, essentially their market capitalisation. Our methodology creates an analogous subsection of the same universe but uses different criteria not
limited to market capitalisation, to produce a variety of indices comparable to the FTSE 100.13 All FTSE All-Share components are ranked by each of
the following fundamentals and the top 100 for these measures is selected and then the following respective indices are formed:14 book equity value,
cash ﬂow, sales, dividends, dividend pay-out ratio, dividend coverage ratio, EBITDA. The metrics are then combined, by taking arithmetic averages,
and two additional indices are formed, after having re-ranked all companies by these composite accountingﬁgures. The Composite Income index is com-
posed of Sales, EBITDA and Dividends; lastly, the Composite Dividend index comprises Dividends, Dividend Coverage and Dividend Pay Out ratios.
Different from the existing literature, this study builds indices around accounting ﬁgures from the income statement and the statement of cash
ﬂows, disregarding the balance sheet. This is intended to reduce the exposure to standard risk factors (size, value and market risk) and in particular
to avoid a book-value strategy construction. The Composite Incomeobjective is to blend three intuitive and representativemetrics fromdifferent sec-
tions of the income statement: the two ‘extremities’ (in terms of where the items appear on the statement), sales and dividends, and a ‘middle’ one,
the EBITDA. Instinctively, suchmeasures can, unlike that proposed by Arnott et al. (2005), guarantee a balance betweenmore and less proﬁtable sec-
tors and between companies that issue dividends and thosewhodo not. On the other hand, the intuition behind the Composite Dividend approach is
to rely on this most objective, transparent and non-manipulable accounting ﬁgure. Yet, as dividend amounts are discretionary and often used by
managers as a means of communication with the markets, the combination with nondiscretionary dimensions, namely dividend coverage and10 As annual reports are unrestated they are favoured over quarterly ones.
11 In daily returns calculations, share issues marked as ‘common stock’ or ‘Mutual or investment trust fund’ are used. Year-end market capitalisations and daily returns are computed,
respectively, with the latest available trading information for each year and daily closing prices.
12 Eqs. (5) and (6) are in accordance with the deﬁnitions reported on Ken French's website. See mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library/variable_deﬁnitions.html.
13 Thus, index reconstruction goes beyond simply changing the benchmark constituents' weights, as thiswould imply having a portfolio of companies characterised by a largemarket cap
and a high metric ﬁgure, thereby excluding small cap ﬁrms with eligible accounting data.
14 By computing 5-year trailing averages of cash ﬂow, sales, dividends, dividend pay-out ratio, dividend coverage ratio and EBITDA, the volatility of the metrics, and consequently the
portfolio turnover, are reduced. Where the sample period available for a particular company was less than ﬁve years, the average was calculated on the available ﬁgures.
6 M. Balatti et al. / International Review of Financial Analysis 51 (2017) 1–15pay-out ratios, aid in constructing a consistent index. In summary, two distinct indices are formed and analysed throughout this study, which we
term ‘Composite Income’ and ‘Composite Dividend’.
Firms' individual portfolioweights are simply computed as the proportion of ametricﬁgure compared to the sumof thatmetric across theﬁltered
top 100 companies. In general terms, this translates mathematically into:
WMetric;i;t ¼
Metrici;t
∑100i¼1 Metrici;t
ð9Þ
Eq. (9) holds for all the indices constructed and assures that the sumof the portfolio constituents' weights is always unity. None of the index strat-
egies proposed above allows for short selling and thus, where accounting values happened to be negative, the observationwas excluded.15 This does
not, however, mean that in case a company had negative cash ﬂow, for example, it could not be included in another index.Moreover, nominimumor
maximumpercentage position constraints are set in the construction process for two reasons. First, taking this stepwouldmean a deﬁnitive trespass
across the active strategy boundary. Second, the methodology lets the accounting ﬁgures “speak for themselves”, which implies a fairer representa-
tion of the underlying economy.
3.4. Index rebalancing and the matching of security prices with fundamentals
In the indexing strategy literature, the rebalancing frequency is conventionally one year since higher frequencies do not deliver a large enough
performance increase to justify the greater turnover. The indices proposed here are no exceptions, also because the accounting data used are extract-
ed from annual reports. Yet there is less agreement in scholarly research regarding the rebalancing date. Often December, the last day of the calendar
year,16 is chosenwithout any explicit rationale. Instead, this work intends tomake amore informed and justiﬁed decision on the rebalancing date. In
the sample studied, December is not the ﬁscal year end for 54% of companies and almost 30% of ﬁrms' years end between January and March, com-
puted by combined ﬁrm-months. The elected rebalancing date is therefore the last trading day of September.17,18
Since a whole year of accounting data is required to calculate the constituents and their relative importance, the initial investment date is the 1st
October 199019whereas theﬁnal one is the 30th September 2014, precisely one year after the latest possible rebalancing date given the availability of
fundamentals on the 30th September 2013. Thus the empirical study effectively spans a 24-year sample.
3.5. Benchmarks
For comparability and benchmarking purposes, two further indices are also constructed: a composite Arnott index20 (or Composite) which com-
bines BookValue, Cash Flow, Sales andDividends and a cap-weighted index. For the latter, themarket capitalization, as calculated in eq. (1), is treated
as any other fundamental measure, including the rebalancing frequency and date. The drivers of the slight discrepancies with the FTSE 100 are per-
haps the longer rebalancing period of the custom build cap-weighted index and the absence of liquidity and size constraints compared to the FTSE
100.21 Overall, notwithstanding the different stock selection rules, discrepancies between the UK index and the custom build benchmark are not ex-
pected to bias the ﬁndings.
3.6. CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart regressions
To offer a deeper insight into the indices returns, multiple regressions are run on daily returns. In particular, portfolio returns are regressed on the
CAPM, the Fama-French three-factor model (FF3) and the Carhart 4-factor model. Following Fama and French (2012), country speciﬁc factors are
favoured over US factors as they ought to provide a superior explanation of the returns' time-series variations.22 The market proxy for these UK fac-
tors is the FTSE All-share index. Threemonth UK Treasury Bill prices obtained fromThomson Reuters Datastream are employed as risk free rate prox-
ies. The Fama-French 3-factor and Carhart 4-factor models are presented below:
rit−rft ¼ ai þ b1i rmt−rft
 þ b2iSMBt þ b3iHMLt þ εit ð10Þ
rit−rft ¼ ai þ b1i rmt−rft
 þ b2iSMBt þ b3iHMLt þ b4iUMDt þ εit ð11Þ
where rit is the return of portfolio i, rmt is the market portfolio, rft is the risk free asset, and b1i , b2i, b3i and b4i are the sensitivities of portfolio i excess
returns to the market risk premium, the size (SMB), book-to-market (HML) and winners minus losers (UMD) factor premiums, respectively.15 Unreported ﬁgures show that the results do not change qualitatively if observations are set to zero rather than being excluded.
16 See, for example, Chow et al. (2011) and Estrada (2008).
17 Adopting the last trading day of the calendar year methodology would imply matching returns with a sizable portion of accounting data at least 9 months out of date. Alternatively,
Marchwould be a better rebalancingmonth, as almost¾of fundamentalﬁgureswould be, atmost, 4months old. Further, to ensure that the accounting data inputted in computing indices'
weights is formally announced and made available to the public, a 6-month lag is allowed, thus, postponing the elected rebalancing date to the last trading day of September. Avoiding
rebalancing at the end of December also circumvents having to make large trades during the holiday period when traded volumes tend to be very low.
18 Thematching procedure between returns and fundamentals described above has a consequence worth noting: the impliedminimum “age” of accounting information contributing to
portfolioweights formation is sixmonths,whilst themaximum is just over 900 days. The latter case occurs in the rare circumstancewhen a company'sﬁscal year ends onApril 30th, of year
t− 1, and the portfolio is not rebalanced until 30th September, of year t + 1.
19 The chosen start date is based purely on data availability. In Section 5 we also perform a battery of robustness tests to show that our ﬁndings are not sample dependent nor driven by
speciﬁc sub-periods.
20 This index is included in order to demonstrate the empirical results of applying the Arnott et al. (2005) construction methodology in the UK and could also be seen as a market value
indifferent index benchmark. In a similar vein to our methodology, the Arnott index selects components by ranking companies based on Book Value, Cash Flow, Sales and Dividends, and
then equallyweighs the fourmetrics to create the Composite portfolio. Book value and cash ﬂow are included in the study solely to replicate Arnott et al. (2005) but are not included in the
indices proposed here.
21 For more details on liquidity and size tests and other possible sources of differences see ‘Ground Rules for the FTSE UK Index Series’ 2015b.
22 The Fama-French factors and momentum factor were downloaded from the Exeter Business school website. See, http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/research/areas/centres/xﬁ/
research/famafrench/ for the factors ﬁgures and Gregory, Tharyan, and Christidis (2013) for the construction methodology.
Table 1
Time-aggregated weights statistics across all years.
Index Maximum Minimum Percentiles
5 95
Cap 10.69% 0.16% 0.19% 3.74%
Equal Weight 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00%
Composite Arnott 19.05% 0.11% 0.15% 3.20%
Composite Income 17.11% 0.09% 0.14% 3.32%
Composite Dividend 41.45% 0.16% 0.22% 3.65%
Time-aggregated summary statistics of the constituents' weights for each of the constructed indices over the entire 24-year sample including themaximumandminimumweights and the
5th and 95th percentiles.
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A detailed analysis of the results is presented in this section. In sum-
mary, the main ﬁndings suggest that the newly proposed fundamental
indices are superior to their cap- and equal-weight counterparts. Their
achieved annual excess returns range from 2-5%-3.5% with a similar or
lower volatility, whilst the resemblance of these indices with the FTSE
100 in terms of total market capitalisation and constituent members,
ensures similar levels of stock diversiﬁcation and liquidity, when
rebalancing the portfolio.4.1. Weight characteristics
Table 1 shows time-aggregated summary statistics of the constitu-
ents' weights for each of the constructed indices over the 24-year sam-
ple. Theweights vary over timebuy by deﬁnition, themeanweight is 1%
across all years and portfolios. Maximum weights vary from 10.69% of
the reference, to a 41.45% in the Composite Dividend index. This ‘ex-
treme’ weight was assigned in 1996 to National Grid. The company
did extremely well afterwards and, in fact, the Composite Dividend
index gained around 50% in 12 months whilst the Composite Arnott
rose by 20%, and the Composite Income and the FTSE 100 TR by 30%.
Large weights in a single stock are not encountered to the same degree
in the Composites and constitute a disadvantage for single characteris-
tic-based portfolios from the perspectives of risk concentration, diversi-
ﬁcation and transaction costs, due to the high price impact.
Reassuringly, however, weights larger than 20% only have a 0.2% fre-
quency in our sample. Furthermore, this phenomenon has obvious but
lesser repercussions for the minimum weights, which are indeed con-
siderably lower in the Composite Arnott and Income cases. Unreported
ﬁgures show that by averaging metrics, i.e. by forming Composite indi-
ces, minimum weights are larger thus ensuring greater investability.
Any constraints on the weights are intentionally not considered in
order to keep the construction steps as simple as possible and to study
the behaviour of unrestricted accounting based indices.
The 5th and 95th percentiles are included because ‘extreme’weights
could be rare occurrences, only affecting a single company during one
particular year. Indeed, by removing the 5% tails from the weightsTable 2
Daily portfolio returns statistics (1st October 1990–30th September 2014).
Index Mean Standard deviation Maximum
FTSE 100 TR 0.04% 1.13% 9.84%
Cap 0.04% 1.15% 10.31%
Equal Weight 0.04% 1.13% 9.99%
Composite Arnott 0.04% 1.15% 10.57%
Composite Income 0.05% 1.16% 10.72%
Composite Dividend 0.05% 0.98% 8.53%
This table reports the average, standard deviation, maximum, minimum, 5th and 95th percent
sample period.distribution in each index, ﬁgures are considerably more clustered.
This indicates how seemingly unreasonable portfolio proportions (e.g.
the Composite Dividend maximum weight) are narrowly conﬁned in-
stances over the 24-year time span.
For purely benchmark purposes, we also construct and analyse an
equallyweighted index,whichwe rebalance annually as for all other in-
dices. In practice, such indices are not very often used as investment
portfolios since they require constant rebalancing. This is reﬂected in
the high turnover costs shown in Table 4. Ex ante, we would expect
the Equal Weight index, being market-value-indifferent, to perform
better than the Cap Weighted counterpart. All empirical tests we per-
form are consistent with our expectations. Indeed, overall the Equal
Weight index delivers improved performances over the FTSE 100, but
fails to outperform our strategies.4.2. Return and performance characteristics
Table 2 summarises numerically and Fig. 1 depicts graphically the
characteristics of the portfolio index returns. At a macro level, index
returns are visually similar, showing volatility clustering around 2001
(the Dot-Com crisis), 2008 (the subprime bubble), and 2011 (the sover-
eign debt crisis), with the global ﬁnancial crisis being the most promi-
nent. The daily average return only varies by 0.01%, from 0.04% to
0.05%. Daily standard deviations diverge to a slightly greater extent
with the Composite Dividend being the smallest and Composite Income
being the highest. Remarkably, the benchmark returns (both Cap and
Composite Arnott) are outperformed by all proposed indices. In terms
of volatility, the Composite Dividend performs notably better than the
references whilst the Composite Income and Arnott achieve similar ﬁg-
ures. Modest returns differences, and to a smaller extent standard devi-
ations discrepancies, are ampliﬁed in annualised equivalents, as Table 3
depicts. The minimum ﬁgures give insight into the indices' individual
downside risk levels. Numbers indicate that the negative extreme
daily return is higher than the benchmarks only in the Composite Divi-
dend case. Yet, the scenario changeswhenmoving towards the centre of
the distribution by 5%where all Composites have higher ﬁfth percentile
returns. The fact thatmaximumandminimumdaily returns of the Com-
posite Dividend index are, in absolute value, the lowest among allMinimum Percentile Skewness Excess kurtosis
5 95
−8.85% −1.69% 1.72% 0.01 6.31
−9.04% −1.68% 1.74% 0.12 7.49
−8.52% −1.67% 1.72% 0.06 7.06
−9.57% −1.65% 1.70% 0.19 8.63
−9.78% −1.68% 1.72% 0.19 8.52
−7.97% −1.44% 1.50% 0.05 7.29
iles, skewness and kurtosis of the returns on each of the constructed index over the entire
Fig. 1. Daily returns plots (1st October 1990–30th September 2014).
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tration risk of this index is well managed by our methodology. This is
consistent with the excess kurtosis ﬁgures that show ‘slimmer’ tails in
the reference distributions. Lastly, although skewness is positive in all
instances, the FTSE 100 is the closest to a normal distribution, followed
by the Dividend coverage and Composite Dividend rules. Overall, the
proposed indices are characterised by higher returns andmore positive
skewness compared to the benchmarks.
The outperformance of the Composite Dividend indexmay be attrib-
uted to the decrease of the risk-free interest rate during the sample pe-
riod, which dropped from 10% to circa 1%. This is likely to be important
for two reasons; ﬁrst, as interest rates decline, investors seeking income
will ﬁnd dividend paying stocks increasingly attractive relative to other
yield bearing assets such as cash and bonds, inﬂating the price of the
dividend paying stocks relative to the non-dividend payers.Table 3
Index performance characteristics (1st October 1990–30th September 2014).
Index Terminal
value of £1
Annualised
compounded returns
Annualised stand
deviation
FTSE 100 TR £7.16 8.55% 17.98%
Cap £8.13 9.12% 18.25%
Equal Weight £9.92 10.03% 17.86%
Composite Arnott £9.74 9.95% 18.22%
Composite Income £12.09 10.94% 18.39%
Composite Dividend £15.65 12.14% 15.58%
Assuming an investment of £1 on 1st October 1990 until the 30th September 2014, the ﬁrst co
present various performance measures on the annualised return performance of the indices.Consequently, this would enhance the total return of the dividend
payers and dividend-weighted indices; second, the cost of borrowing,
including borrowing to pay dividends has declined. As companies that
pay dividends have stable cash ﬂows that facilitate borrowing, it is likely
that dividend paying stocks have beneﬁted more from the lower cost of
borrowing than the non-dividend paying stocks (Armitage, 2012).
Table 3 illustrates standard portfolio performancemeasures. Assum-
ing an initial investment of £1 on 1st October 1990 ﬁnishing on 30th
September 2014, one can see thewealth accumulated by each of the in-
dices. All accounting based portfolios have generated more wealth for
every pound invested compared to the cap weighted indices. The Com-
posite Dividend approach even doubled the ﬁnal wealth compared to
the London Stock Exchange index. In annual terms, the Composite In-
come and Dividend approaches generated 10.94% and 12.14% average
returns respectively whereas the FTSE 100 produced a smaller meanard Annualised semi
standard deviation
Sharpe ratio Sortino ratio CAPM Beta
12.75% 0.228 0.321 1.06
12.91% 0.256 0.362 1.07
12.71% 0.313 0.440 1.03
12.83% 0.302 0.429 1.04
12.95% 0.353 0.502 1.06
11.11% 0.494 0.693 0.84
lumn presents the total wealth accrued by each index proposed; the remaining columns
Table 4
Turnover and transaction costs.
Index Turnover Ann comp returns Net Ann comp returns Std Dev Sharpe ratio Net Sharpe ratio
Cap 10.17% 9.12% 9.03% 18.25% 0.256 0.251
Equal Weight 30.34% 10.03% 9.75% 17.86% 0.313 0.297
Composite Arnott 26.17% 9.95% 9.71% 18.22% 0.302 0.289
Composite Income 25.08% 10.94% 10.71% 18.39% 0.353 0.341
Composite Dividend 46.29% 12.14% 11.70% 15.58% 0.494 0.466
Table 4 reports arithmetic averages of the yearly turnover over the 24-year sample and summary statistics of the net composite returns after allowing for transactions costs. By construc-
tion, a cap-weighted portfolio has the lowest turnover as weights and market capitalisations change simultaneously through time. Following Brooks et al. (2001), we assume a conserva-
tive transaction cost of 1.7% on round-trip trade (purchase and sale).
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this study outperformed their cap-weighted counterparts by 2.39%
and 3.59%.
Furthermore, this additional performance does not come at the ex-
pense of increased volatility. In fact, the Composite Income index regis-
ters a slightly lower standard deviation whilst the Composite Dividend
presents an annualised standard deviation, which is 2.4% lower. Natu-
rally, these translate into increased Sharpe ratios (SR) compared with
a 0.228 ratio between excess returns and volatility for the FTSE 100,
the two proposed Composite portfolios achieve returns of 0.353 and
0.494 per unit of risk, thereby outperforming the Composite Arnott
index too. A twofold increase in the SR, also supported by qualitatively
similar Sortino ratios, conﬁrms that both Composite indices are better
proxies of the optimal portfolio.
4.3. Turnover and transaction costs
In this section, we provide a thorough analysis of the tradability of
our proposed indices, by focusing on turnover and transaction costs
and we compare our ﬁndings with their cap-weighted equivalents.
Table 4 helps to draw conclusions as to which of these portfolios is
best when evaluated on this basis.
Turnover is computed as the sum of the absolute difference between
the ﬁnal weights of every ‘investment’ year (October to September) and
the initial weights of the following year. Portfolio ending weights result
from price returns, i.e. not taking dividends into account. The ﬁgures re-
ported in Table 4 are arithmetic averages of the yearly turnover across
the 24-year sample. By construction, a cap-weighted portfolio has the
lowest turnover as weights and market capitalisations change simulta-
neously through time. Additions and deletions due to ﬂuctuations in
market caps are the main causes of turnover in a price-based index. In-
stead, for fundamental-based indices, turnover is generated by: i) the
purchase of more shares of companies whose market value has de-
creased more than the reduction of the accounting metrics or whose
market value has increased less than the surge of the accounting met-
rics; and ii) the sale of stocks of those constituents whose share prices
have experienced an upsurge larger than the fundamentals and viceTable 5
Liquidity and diversiﬁcation measures.
Index Cap ratio Concentration ratio Herﬁndahl
Div ratio
Entropy
Div ratio
Cap 1.00 0.45 0.97 4.05
Equal Weight 1.00 0.10 0.99 4.37
Composite Arnott 0.94 0.40 0.96 3.84
Composite Income 0.94 0.39 0.96 3.87
Composite Dividend 0.85 0.28 0.95 3.86
The relative investment capacity (cap ratio) is computed as the market capitalization of
the index over the market cap of the cap-weighted index, i.e. the benchmark. The portion
of the total index capitalization that belongs to the top 10 stocks bymetric weight in each
index measures the Concentration ratio. This metric reﬂects the trade-off between diver-
siﬁcation beneﬁts and transaction costs. The intrinsic diversiﬁcation of each index is fur-
ther evaluated with two methods: the Herﬁndahl index and the entropy measure of
concentration (Garrison & Paulson, 1973). The higher the computed ﬁgure, the larger
the diversiﬁcation.versa. In otherwords, the turnover of the portfolios reﬂect the stickiness
of the underlying metrics relatively to the market price. On the one
hand, accounting measures that correlate the least with stock prices
will result in indices with higher turnovers as companies will be
added, deleted and reweighted more often. On the other hand, funda-
mentals that display a higher persistence from year to year (relatively
to market prices) would translate in portfolios characterised by lower
turnovers. The source of the high turnover in the composite Dividend
might therefore be to the fact that dividends tend to be sticky in com-
parison to stock prices as themanagement engages in dividend smooth-
ing and tends to be reluctant in cutting them.
Following Brooks, Rew, and Ritson (2001), a conservative transac-
tion cost of 1.7% on round trip trade (purchase and sale) is assumed in
order to analyse the impact of turnover on the excess returns of the pro-
posed indices.23 Owing to the higher turnover, the net annual
compounded returns and net Sharpe ratios of alternative indices expe-
rience a larger abatement. However, the reductions are not sufﬁcient
to reverse the outperformance conclusions made earlier based on
gross ﬁgures. Indeed, the annual excess returns of the Composite In-
come and dividend approaches over the cap reference are 1.68% and
2.67% (and 1% and 2% over the Composite Arnott index), whilst Sharpe
ratios are 36% and 85% greater respectively (and 18% and 61% larger
than for the Composite Arnott index).
4.4. Portfolio liquidity and diversiﬁcation
Portfolio liquidity and capacity are important aspects to consider
when designing indices. In conjunction with diversiﬁcation measures,
Table 5 helps to further evaluate the quality of the two weighting
schemes studied.
The relative investment capacity, or cap ratio, of each index is mea-
sured as the market capitalization of that index divided by the market
capitalization of the cap-weighted index, which constitutes the bench-
mark. Results indicate that the total capitalisation embraced by themar-
ket value indifferent indices is very close to the benchmark. In light of
this ﬁnding and since both the FTSE 100 and the composite indices con-
structed in this study use the FTSE All share as the available investment
universe, it is expected that almost all of the Composites' constituents
are sharedwith the FTSE 100. In particular, the average overlap between
the constituents of the constructed indices and those of the FTSE 100 is
approximately 90%. The cap ratios also aid in quantifying themagnitude
of the second advantage of capweighting over the alternative strategies,
namely themarket clearing.24 The above ﬁndings are re-assuring for in-
vestors, since a similar overall capitalisation and component group of
stocks to those of the FTSE 100, reﬂects an analogous liquidity when
rebalancing the portfolio. Composite index ﬁgures, ranging from 85%
to 94% overlap with the FTSE 100 components, are to be contrasted23 In the UK, as of 2015, a stamp duty tax of 0.5% is applicable when buying shares, even
from abroad, in UK companies listed on the main market (i.e. excluding AIM) if the trans-
action value is over £1000; when selling shares, no such tax has to be paid. The remaining
1.2% can be broken down into 0.80% bid-ask spread and 0.40% commission costs (twice).
24 Indeed, a plausible interpretation of the cap ratio is the relative investment capacity or,
in other words, how much money can be invested in price indifferent approaches com-
pared to the traditional one.
Fig. 2. Industry composition by year.
10 M. Balatti et al. / International Review of Financial Analysis 51 (2017) 1–15with ﬁndings of 2/3 in the US market by Arnott et al. (2005). It can be
further concluded that, quantitatively speaking, the market clearing
beneﬁt of cap weighting is a minor drawback that shareholders should
willingly accept in order to achieve the superior returns that accounting
based indices can generate.
The concentration ratio is measured by considering the portion of
the total index capitalization that belonged to the top 10 stocks by met-
ric weight in each index, reﬂecting the trade-off between diversiﬁcation
beneﬁts and transaction costs. All display a cap concentration in the top
decile of the index comparable to or lower than the benchmark.25
The inherent diversiﬁcation of the strategies is further gauged by
two statisticalmeasures: the Herﬁndahl index and the entropymeasure
of concentration suggested by Garrison and Paulson (1973). Although
initially proposed as measures of economic concentration, we argue
that meaningful results can also be obtained when these statistics are
applied to ﬁnancial portfolios. The larger the calculated value, the higher
the index diversiﬁcation. The formulae used in computing the metrics
are the following:
H ¼ 1−∑
100
n¼1
w2n ð12Þ
E ¼−C∑
100
n¼1
wn lnwn ð13Þ
where:
wn is the weight of the company n in the index and C is an arbitrary
scaling constant set to 1.25 On the one hand, a lower relative cap amount in top constituentsmay offer greater di-
versiﬁcation beneﬁts, yet on the other hand, it might be more challenging and costly to
synthetically replicate a less concentrated portfolio.Noticeably, Eq. (13) ismaximisedwhenwn is 1/100, i.e. in the case of
an equally weighted portfolio. Qualitatively, the results of both diversi-
ﬁcation measures do not differ and the Composites follow closely be-
hind the cap-weighting scheme under both metrics. In summary, the
concentration ratio determines that the alternative portfolios are better
diversiﬁed in the top 10th percentile, though the inference is reversed
when examining the entire index composition.
4.5. Industry composition
Some additional analysis of interest is contained in Fig. 2 by present-
ing index composition by sector. Notably, the Composite Income index
is characterised by the most stable allocations, closely followed by the
Composite Arnott. These portfolios fairly represent the gentle transition
of the industry composition in the UK economy, captured by the devel-
opment in accounting measures. In contrast, the reference portfolio re-
ﬂects the variations in investors' preferences exempliﬁed by the
technology and telecoms temporary peaks around 2001. Accordingly,
accounting based indices might be used, inter alia, by regulators and in-
vestors as superior indicators of the real economy given their ability to
dampen the effects of stockholders' sentimentality on index
composition.
5. Robustness tests
The analysis is focused on the comparison between the two bench-
marks considered (Cap and FTSE 100 indices) and the two Composite
indices (income and dividend). From a mean variance perspective, the
superior Sharpe and Sortino ratios contained in Table 3 indicate the
larger returns per unit of risk taken (measured by volatility and semi-
volatility). The inferences made would not be different if risk was mea-
sured by the market beta, since the positive excess returns come with
Fig. 3. Cumulative returns & benchmark and cumulative growth of £1 (1990–2014).
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kurtosis can be interpreted as a lower risk of extreme events and there-
fore a statistically higher probability of future returns being closer to the
reported average returns, i.e. the mean of the distribution.
5.1. Cumulative returns
Fig. 3 presents no evidence that long-term performances are domi-
nated by one particular sub-sample period. In fact, the net asset value
of the Composite Income and Dividend steadily grew with time,
outperforming both the Composite Arnott and, even more so, the FTSE
100. Moreover, the spread between the former two and the latter two
broadens through time. Our intuition on the divergence between ‘In-
come’ and ‘Dividend’, depicted from around 2011 until the end of the
sample, is the poor performance of ﬁxed income yields and the conse-
quent ﬂight of investors towards high dividend paying stocks.
To overcome any ‘starting point’ bias, cumulative returns are com-
puted by rolling the initial investment date forward in 6-month steps.
The x-axis in Fig. 4 reports the entry date, whilst the y-axis shows the
terminal values of £1 for the respective entry dates, i.e. the ﬁnal points
of the index value lines traced in Fig. 3. Note, ﬁrstly, how the excess
returns over the benchmark diminish for shorter investment horizons,
yet in no circumstances do they turn negative. Thus, moving the initial
date forward does not lead to qualitatively different performances com-
pared to the results previously presented, consistent with theFig. 4. Cumulative returns at 6-month rolling entry date. We calculate cumulative returns
by moving the initial investment date forward in 6-month steps to address any ‘starting
date’ bias. The x-axis is the entry date, the y-axis is the terminal value of £1 for the
respective entry dates (the investment ending values reported in Fig. 3).hypothesis of ex-ante inefﬁciency of cap-weighted indices. Indeed, the
ultimate performance is unaffected by market movements as the FTSE
100 loses ground in favour of accounting-based indices because of its
very nature. Only time is able to show the efﬁciency gap between the
two conceptually different indexation strategies and hence, from an in-
vestment perspective, the proposed indices should be regarded as long-
term investments.
In a similar fashion, examining 5-year rolling investment windows
relieves any possible ‘ending date’ bias. Panel A of Fig. 5 still traces the
FTSE 100 below all other indices most of the time. Interestingly, the
benchmark delivers the relatively best returns in booming times and
when bubbles form, for example before 2000, 2008 and 2011. Yet, as cri-
ses begun, its performance plummeted. In fact the FTSE 100 is the only
index that crossed the £1 dotted line, meaning that only the Composite
indices always secured a ﬁnal investment value, in nominal terms, at
least as large as the initial one. Panel B displays evenmore clearly the su-
perior performance of the Composite Income.
Throughout the sample analysed, in fact, its excess returns over the
FTSE 100 have consistently been positive with two exceptions: the
strongly bull markets preceding the dot-com and sub-prime crises.
Under such circumstances a market price-based approach could be
regarded as a momentum strategy that effectively puts increasingly
higher bets, owing to the market cap expansion, on stocks that have
performed well in the recent past. During strong momentum phases,
cap-weighted strategies are, by construction, challenging to outperform
as they directly exploit that market feature. Yet only in such marketFig. 5. Cumulative returns at rolling 5-year window. Any ending date bias is overcome by
looking at 5-year rolling investment windows. Panel A plots the FTSE 100 and accounting
based indices. Panel B presents the overperformance of the Composite Income over the
Cap.
Table 6
Yearly returns.
Year FTSE 100 TR Cap Equal Weight Composite Arnott Composite Income Composite Dividend Comp Inc. – FTSE Comp Div – FTSE
1991 29.33% 29.48% 25.57% 31.10% 28.22% 26.47% −1.11% −2.86%
1992 9.16% 9.55% 4.18% 4.24% 8.27% 0.77% −0.89% −8.39%
1993 20.93% 20.10% 25.15% 36.73% 36.14% 40.89% 15.21% 19.95%
1994 −1.13% 4.63% 6.48% 1.00% 6.10% 0.15% 7.24% 1.28%
1995 28.28% 28.11% 28.65% 22.02% 29.06% 9.36% 0.78% −18.92%
1996 18.91% 16.13% 13.54% 10.26% 16.73% 12.64% −2.18% −6.27%
1997 33.51% 33.10% 27.94% 25.10% 33.33% 50.22% −0.19% 16.71%
1998 6.94% 7.09% 10.01% 8.53% 10.02% 29.90% 3.08% 22.97%
1999 10.94% 9.13% 9.33% 3.31% 3.31% 3.60% −7.64% −7.35%
2000 −1.59% 19.04% 16.96% 30.77% 33.62% 24.49% 35.22% 26.09%
2001 −15.51% −21.83% −22.40% −7.09% −2.99% −10.31% 12.52% 5.20%
2002 −27.36% −27.65% −26.60% −25.35% −25.02% −23.36% 2.35% 4.00%
2003 29.50% 32.65% 39.26% 35.16% 35.94% 37.86% 6.45% 8.37%
2004 10.53% 10.47% 14.62% 15.59% 14.15% 11.64% 3.62% 1.10%
2005 22.37% 21.46% 25.63% 23.48% 21.35% 30.78% −1.02% 8.41%
2006 11.61% 12.70% 21.71% 10.23% 9.84% 25.04% −1.77% 13.42%
2007 8.17% 7.35% 0.46% 9.92% 7.25% 4.47% −0.92% −3.70%
2008 −29.00% −29.21% −31.58% −27.99% −30.78% −32.93% −1.78% −3.93%
2009 19.93% 36.54% 44.40% 33.53% 32.43% 50.81% 12.50% 30.88%
2010 10.82% 14.39% 18.82% 12.20% 11.44% 15.91% 0.62% 5.09%
2011 −7.03% −10.11% −9.58% −12.46% −12.26% −18.67% −5.23% −11.65%
2012 16.17% 18.04% 21.82% 19.15% 19.73% 28.27% 3.56% 12.09%
2013 17.18% 16.79% 19.56% 13.23% 14.23% 22.42% −2.95% 5.24%
2014 2.36% 1.39% 1.36% 2.92% 2.47% 3.80% 0.11% 1.44%
Yearly returns over the 24-year sample. The last two columns present the difference in returns between our two indices and the FTSE 100. Positive (negative) ﬁgures indicate a higher
(lower) performance delivered by the Composite Income or Dividend indices.
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ite indices. The overall outperformance of the proposed strategy over
the FTSE 100 is, however, clearly depicted. This phenomenon is consis-
tent with the short run noise and long runmarket efﬁciency hypothesis.
To complete the analysis, Tables 6 and 7 present annual and 5-year pe-
riod returns respectively, providing evidence that the proposed indices
produce a continuous over-performance over the entire samplewith no
year-speciﬁc or sub-period effects.5.2. Maximum drawdown
An additional statistical tool that portfolio managers often quote is
the maximum drawdown (DD). Fig. 6, Panel A, plots the percentage
maximum DD calculated over a 60-trading day (a quarter) window.
As expected, the largest drawdowns occurred during the two crises.
For all four indices, the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis registered the largest DD
(of around 30%) over the whole period. At ﬁrst sight, the maximum
drawdown plots are comparatively similar, with perhaps the exception
of the Composite Dividend. Panel B, displays the graphs of Panel A com-
bined into a single chart. Starting with the most prominent decline, as
anticipated, the Composite Income and Arnott rules record similar ﬁg-
ures whilst the Composite Dividend registers a modestly greater fall in
value of circa 40% over a quarter. Around the year 2000, three other sig-
niﬁcant troughs are depicted on the graph; interestingly, in two occur-
rences the FTSE 100 lost the most ground, with the market value
indifferent indices, instead, suffering smaller or similar losses between
them. In conclusion, given the high degrees of resemblance, theTable 7
5-Year multi-period returns.
Period FTSE 100 TR Cap Equal Weight Composite Arnott Co
1990–1995 110.53% 121.12% 117.29% 124.64% 15
1995–2000 82.00% 110.48% 102.99% 98.15% 13
2000–2005 8.46% 1.53% 15.34% 35.33% 38
2005–2010 15.68% 35.47% 44.25% 32.03% 21
2010–2014 30.98% 27.16% 34.97% 22.31% 23
5-Yearmultiperiod returns over the 24-year sample. The last two columnspresent thedifferenc
indicate a higher (lower) performance delivered by the Composite Income or Dividend indicesmaximum drawdown does not represent a signiﬁcantly discriminating
metric between cap and accounting weighting schemes.
6. Performance attribution
The strongest opponents of accounting based indexation, including
Blitz and Swinkels (2008) and Asness (2006), argue that the source of
its outperformance over cap weighted portfolios originates from its ex-
posure to Fama-French factors, and in particular to value. Indeed, Arnott
et al. (2005), as well as Chow et al. (2011) are unsuccessful in ﬁnding
positive and signiﬁcant 3-factor and 4-factor alphas. The following
two tables aim to elucidate whether excess earnings persist once daily
returns are regressed onto a variety of risk factors, thereby outlining
possible performance drivers. The ﬁrst regression is performed using
an intercept, in order to estimate the mean returns. As parameters are
added to new regressions, p-values indicate whether the intercepts
will remain positive and signiﬁcantly different from zero. The reported
regression alphas are annualised unless otherwise stated.
Panel A of Table 8 shows the average arithmetic returns over the
whole sample. Here there exist two noteworthy observations. Firstly,
Composite indices display signiﬁcantly positive mean returns, whereas
the FTSE 100 does not. Secondly, the Composite Income and Dividend
do better than the sums of their parts. Indeed, unreported results
show that themean alpha computed from their respective components
is lower than their actual intercept; the Composite Arnott index fails to
accomplish this, however.
Panel B, instead, gives insight into the market risk adjusted returns.
In this scenario, the Composite Arnott and the FTSE 100 do not providemposite Income Composite Dividend Comp Inc. – FTSE Comp Div – FTSE
1.82% 92.51% 41.29% −18.03%
0.65% 182.13% 48.65% 100.13%
.53% 39.38% 30.07% 30.92%
.56% 54.99% 5.88% 39.31%
.71% 31.77% −7.27% 0.78%
e in returns between the two proposed indices and the FTSE 100. Positive (negative)ﬁgures
.
Fig. 6. 60-Days max drawdown. Panel A, presents the percentage maximumDrawdown (DD) computed over a 60-trading day window. Panel B, combines DD plots of Panel A in a single
chart.
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posite Arnott and Income diminish marginally once market risk is
accounted for. On the contrary, the Composite Dividend's superior per-
formance, in relation to the benchmark, grows by almost one hundred
basis points from 3.45 pps to 4.40 pps. This implies that market expo-
sure is not the propeller of the excess performance.
The Fama-French 3-factor regressions26 reported in Table 9, Panel A,
indicate that, ﬁrst and most importantly, the two novel indices (Com-
posite Income and Dividend) succeed where the market value26 Themarket proxy in this analysis is the original investment universe, i.e. the FTSE All-
share index.indifferent literature has so far not. Refreshingly, the returns of the
two constructed portfolios are positive and signiﬁcant even when ac-
counting for market (rmrf), value (hml) and size (smb) factors (Fama
& French, 1992). Their positive excess returns, displayed in Panel B,
are also statistically different from zero net of the Carhart (1997) 4-fac-
tor exposure effects. Furthermore, it is worth noting how the intercepts
of the Composites change from the simplest regression to the Carhart 4-
factor speciﬁcation. As expected, the alphas generally decrease as more
factors are added; the “unexplained” returns show a drastic fall, around
6%, in the CAPM regression, indicating the tie of these portfolioswith the
whole market. Yet, netting the effects of value, size and even momen-
tum only decreases the intercepts by less than 1% in all instances.
Table 8
Regressions on intercept only and CAPM.
Panel A: regression on intercept
only
Panel B: regression on CAPM
Index α Index α rmrf
FTSE 100 5.13% FTSE 100 −0.57% 1.06***
0.166 0.148 0.00
Cap 6.26%* Cap 0.17% 1.07***
0.097 0.789 0.00
Equal Weight 7.06%* Equal Weight 1.26% 1.03***
0.057 0.214 0.00
Composite Arnott 7.02%* Composite Arnott 1.11% 1.04***
0.062 0.304 0.00
Composite Income 7.97%** Composite Income 1.98%* 1.06***
0.036 0.057 0.00
Composite Dividend 8.58%*** Composite Dividend 3.83%*** 0.84***
0.008 0.006 0.00
*, **, *** = signiﬁcant at 10%, 5% and 1% conﬁdence level. Reported regression alphas are
annualised. Panel A displays the results (and p-values underneath) of regressions of
returns using only an intercept, i.e. the mean returns over the period. Panel B, instead,
shows the market risk adjusted returns.
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value (hml) factor, whilst the Composite Dividend is also meaningfully
exposed to size (smb). Table 9 illustrates that, in contrast with the FTSE
100, which displays negative value and size exposures reﬂecting its tilt
towards large and growth companies, the Composite indices offer a re-
liable avenue for accessing value and size premia. A second and perhaps
less straightforward vindication is found in the noise-in-price literature.
Arnott and Hsu (2008) and Arnott, Hsu, Liu, andMarkowitz (2014) ﬁnd
that, de facto, any deviations from priced weighted portfolio construc-
tion would spontaneously lead to value exposures.
Overall, the above ﬁndings display how the proposed accounting
based indices beneﬁt fromhigher Sharpe andTreynor ratios and also ex-
hibit positive and signiﬁcant Fama-French and Carhart alphas, evidence
of better portfolio construction rather than a higher exposure to known
risk factors.7. Conclusions
A widespread consensus among ﬁnancial markets participants is to
proxy the mean-variance efﬁcient market portfolio with cap-weighted
indices. The entire passive investment industry, including a large frac-
tion of ETFs, base their investment belief on this assumption. However,
both theoretically and empirically, the hypothesis does not hold. Al-
though capitalisation weighted indices beneﬁt from a variety of advan-
tages, this study argues and empirically shows that investors can do
better if they ‘marry’ price indifferent strategies such as the proposedTable 9
Regressions on Fama-French 3-factor and Carhart 4-factor models.
Panel A: regression on FF 3-factor Panel B
Index α rmrf smb hml Index
FTSE 100 −0.19% 1.013*** −0.142*** −0.028*** FTSE 10
0.479 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cap 0.37% 1.029*** −0.110*** 0.053*** Cap
0.544 0.000 0.000 0.000
Equal Weight 0.76% 1.058*** 0.094*** 0.110*** Equal W
0.389 0.000 0.000 0.000
Comp Arnott 0.74% 1.031*** 0.007 0.229*** Comp A
0.451 0.000 0.262 0.000
Comp income 1.67%* 1.045*** 0.001 0.195*** Comp in
0.082 0.000 0.882 0.000
Comp Dividend 3.16%** 0.908*** 0.204*** 0.102*** Comp D
0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000
*, **, ***= signiﬁcant at 10%, 5% and 1% conﬁdence level. Reported regression alphas are annuali
4-factor regression results.Composite Income and Dividend portfolios, in absolute terms and on a
risk adjusted basis.
This research ﬁlls a gap in the literature by ﬁrst providing out-of-
sample results on the UK market that can be compared with those
from the seminal paper by Arnott et al. (2005) paper. We employ a
25-year data sample that spans from 1989 to 2014 and thus includes
the 2008 ﬁnancial turmoil. Two simple, novel index designs are also
proposed, both characterised by annual rebalancing and relative portfo-
lio proportions derived from readily available accounting values such as
Sales, Dividends and EBITDA. Composites formed by simple arithmetic
averages of fundamentals are also tested and found to be preferable
over single metrics.
In summary, the results show that annual excess returns ranging
from 2.39% for the Composite Income index to 3.59% of the Composite
Dividend series are achieved over the sample analysed, experiencing
analogous or lower volatility compared to the FTSE 100. Predictably,
the resulting Sharpe ratios increased more than twofold in certain
cases. The higher turnover, by construction, of deviations from cap
weighting implies larger trading fees, but nonetheless the superior per-
formance is robust to the assumed 1.7% transaction cost. At the same
time, the similarities of the indices with the FTSE 100 in terms of total
market capitalisation and constituent members ensure similar levels
of liquidity when rebalancing the portfolio.
It is also found that the Composite Dividend and Income
outperformances are robust across time, bull and bear markets and in-
dependent of initial and terminal investment dates. Further, owing to
the fairer representation of the underlying economy, such indices
could ﬁnd further application in regulatory and investment decision-
making. Overall, our ﬁndings are not only consistent with those of the
market value indifferent literature in that cap weighting can be im-
proved in mean-variance terms, but also present an outperformance
of the proposed indices over Arnott et al. (2005).
From a theoretical perspective, these results support noise-in-price
models that imply an ex-ante underperformance of cap weighting and
contribute to backing the hypothesis that the market is noisy in the
short run and efﬁcient in the long run. The Composites vividly outper-
form capitalisationweighting in all other circumstances, which contrib-
ute to a two-fold increase in terminal portfolio values. Based on
regressions of returns on standard pricing models (CAPM, FF3 and
Carhart), the sources of the proposed indices' outperformance are
found in the following elements. Firstly, a true ex-ante inefﬁciency of
cap weighting that market value indifferent strategies are able to over-
come. Secondly, a greater exposure to risk factors in addition tomarket,
value, size and momentum. Thirdly, as the signiﬁcant FF three-factor
Carhart 4-factor alphas demonstrate, a better portfolio construction.
We see no evidence that the ﬁndings presentedwould not be replicated
in the future given the long and internally varied sample studied and the
factor-adjusted return results. Indeed, the proposed indices could: regression on Carhart 4-factor
α rmrf smb hml umd
0 −0.15% 1.014*** −0.141*** −0.028*** 0.004***
0.569 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003
0.20% 1.025*** −0.113*** 0.053*** −0.019***
0.739 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
eight 0.50% 1.052*** 0.091*** 0.111*** −0.028***
0.553 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
rnott 0.71% 1.030*** 0.007 0.229*** −0.002
0.465 0.000 0.286 0.000 0.641
come 1.79%* 1.048*** 0.003 0.195*** 0.014***
0.062 0.000 0.666 0.000 0.005
ividend 3.23%** 0.910*** 0.205*** 0.102*** 0.008
0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.232
sed. Panel A reports Fama-French 3-factor regression results whilst Panel B reports Carhart
15M. Balatti et al. / International Review of Financial Analysis 51 (2017) 1–15provide a robust path for enhanced performance and beneﬁt passive
investors.
Further research could be pursued in the ﬁeld of market value indif-
ferent indexation given the strong empirical evidence available
throughout a range of markets. Additional applications, such as the reg-
ulatory one cited above, are worth exploring in more detail. Equally,
analogous empirical tests could be applied to the broader UK indices
using more relaxed criteria such as short selling or constraints such as
maximum and minimum weights, as well as examining their perfor-
mance over long bearish periods. Disentangling the possible perfor-
mance attribution drivers would also further assist researchers in
understanding which really contribute to the excess returns.
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